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MIMO Gaussian Broadcast Channels with
Common, Private and Confidential Messages
Ziv Goldfeld and Haim H. Permuter
Abstract
The two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian broadcast channel (BC) with common, private and
confidential messages is considered. The transmitter sends a common message to both users, a confidential message
to User 1 and a private (non-confidential) message to User 2. The secrecy-capacity region is characterized by showing
that certain inner and outer bounds coincide and that the boundary points are achieved by Gaussian inputs, which
enables the development of a tight converse. The proof relies on factorization of upper concave envelopes and a
variant of dirty-paper coding (DPC). It is shown that the entire region is exhausted by using DPC to cancel out the
signal of the non-confidential message at Receiver 1, thus making DPC against the signal of the confidential message
unnecessary. A numerical example illustrates the secrecy-capacity results.
Index Terms
Additive Gaussian channel, broadcast channel, dirty-paper coding multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) com-
munications, physical-layer security, upper concave envelopes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Additive Gaussian channels are a common model for wireless communication, whose open nature makes it
vulnerable to a variety of security threats, such as eavesdropping. However, eavesdroppers are not always a malicious
entity from which all transmissions are concealed. Rather, a legitimate recipient of one message may serve as an
eavesdropper for other messages. We encapsulate this notion in a two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
Gaussian broadcast channel (BC) with common, private and confidential messages (Fig. 1). The common message
M0 is intended to both users, whileM1 andM2 are private messages that are sent to User 1 and User 2, respectively.
Furthermore,M1 is confidential and is kept secret from User 2. Many real-life scenarios fall within this framework.
One such example is a banking site that simultaneously: (i) broadcasts an advertisement to all online users (modeled
by M0); (ii) offers public information (such as material on different banking programs, reports, forecasts, etc.) that
is available only to users that are interested in it (modeled by the private message M2); and (iii) provides an online
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Fig. 1: MIMO Gaussian BC.
banking service, by which users can access their account and perform transactions (this confidential information is
modeled by M1). Furthermore, 5th generation (5G) mobile technology [1] puts significant emphasis on advanced
MIMO capabilities and multiuser communication. In particular, schemes supporting multiple users exchanging
various kinds of information over a MIMO communication system (and their fundamental limits) are of great
interest. The studied MIMO Gaussian BC is an instance of a system where these aspects are jointly incorporated.
In recent years, information-theoretic security over MIMO communication systems has been an active field of
research (see [2] for a recent survey of progress in this area). Most noticeably, the secrecy-capacity of the Gaussian
wiretap channel (WTC) was characterized in [3]–[5] for the multiple-input single-output scenario, and in [6]–[10]
for the MIMO case. The Gaussian MIMO WTC with a common message was studied in [11]. In [12], the secrecy-
capacity region for the setting with a degraded message set and an external eavesdropper (from which all messages
are concealed) was derived. The MIMO Gaussian BC with confidential messages, in which the private message
to each user is kept secret from the opposite user, without and with a common message, was solved in [13] and
[14], respectively. As the capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC without secrecy requirements was derived in
[15] with no common message present, and in [16] with a common message, this work settles the two remaining
scenarios concerning secrecy. More specifically, focusing on the two-user MIMO Gaussian BC with or without
a common message and where both, either or neither of the private messages are secret, we derive the secrecy-
capacity regions of the only two instances that remained unsolved until now. A pointer to each past result and the
contribution of this work are found in Table I.
Up until the more recent work of Geng and Nair [16], all the aforementioned results established the optimality
of Gaussian inputs based on channel enhancement arguments, originally used in [15] to characterize the private
message capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC (without secrecy constraints). In a nutshell, the idea of [15] was
to approximate the actual BC using enhanced BCs, for which the entropy power inequality applies and is invoked to
establish the optimality of Gaussian inputs (similarly to the proof for the scalar case by Bergmans [17]). Continuity
arguments are then used to characterize the capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC of interest. The limitation
of the channel enhancement technique seems to be the difficulty in generalizing it to account for both private and
common messages. Attempted adaptations of this technique to scenarios comprising common and private messages
3TABLE I: MIMO Gaussian BCs with/without a common message and where none/some/all of the private messages
are secret - Summary of Results
M0 M1 M2 Solution
— Private Private Weingarten-Steinberg-Shamai 2006 [15]
Public Private Private Geng-Nair 2014 [16]
Public Secret from User 2 — Ly-Liu-Liang 2010 [11]
— Secret from User 2 Secret from User 1 Liu-Liu-Poor-Shamai 2010 [13]
Public Secret from User 2 Secret from User 1 Ekrem-Ulukus 2012 [14]
— Secret from User 2 Private This work
Public Secret from User 2 Private This work
include, e.g., [18] and [19], where generally unmatching inner and outer bounds or constant gap-from-capacity
results were derived for the MIMO Gaussian BC without and with security requirements, respectively.
Our goal is to fully characterize the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private
and confidential messages and show that it is attained by Gaussian inputs. Since channel enhancement arguments are
insufficient for this purpose, we adopt the approach of [16] for proving the optimality of Gaussians via factorization
of upper concave envelopes (UCEs). We start by characterizing the secrecy-capacity region under an input covariance
constraint for the setting with private and confidential messages only (i.e., when no common message is present).
The derivation first describes the boundary points of a certain outer bound on the secrecy-capacity region as an
UCE of a function of the input distribution. With this result at hand, we show that if this UCE satisfies a specific
factorization property, then it is maximized by a Gaussian input distribution. Then, using an adaptation of dirty-paper
coding (DPC) [20], we establish the equivalence of the outer bound to a particular inner bound, thus characterizing
the secrecy-capacity region. Interestingly, optimality is achieved by using DPC to cancel out the signal of the
non-confidential message M2 at Receiver 1 only. The other variant, i.e., DPC against the signal of the confidential
message M1, turns out to be unnecessary. This is in contrast to the case without secrecy requirements [16], in
which both variants of DPC are necessary to exhaust the entire region.
We then focus on the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages (Fig. 1) and derive our
main result by characterizing its secrecy-capacity region. Although this is a generalization of the problem without
a common message, the secrecy-capacity of the latter setting is solved first. In doing so, we use the result without
a common message to show that Gaussian inputs are optimal for a certain portion of the region with a common
message. The rest of the region is characterized by extending the tools from [16] and introducing the notion of
a double-nested UCE. Gaussian inputs once again are shown to attain optimality. Finally, we visualize our results
by a numerical example. Since the obtained regions are described as non-convex matrix optimization problems, we
convert them into a computationally efficient form by relying on matrix decomposition properties from [21].
Organization: The UCE factorization method introduced in [16] and further developed in this work relies on
rather heavy machinery and many technical functional analysis results. The proofs of our main secrecy-capacity
theorems (i.e., without and with a common message) frequently refer to these auxiliary results while also relying on
4additional information-theoretic arguments (e.g., DPC). In structuring this paper, it was important for us to distill the
information-theoretic arguments from the functional analysis aspects of this work for two main reasons. First, this
would ease the flow trough the information-theoretic proofs and highlight the usage of the UCE factorization method
for showing that Gaussian inputs achieve capacity. Second, by aggregating the machinery behind this method in a
separate section we hope to facilitate its application to additional research problems in future work.
In accordance to the above, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives definitions and describes
the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages. In Section III we state our main results:
the secrecy-capacity regions of the considered BC without and with a common message, given in Theorems 1 and
2, respectively. Discussions of these results and a numerical example to illustrate the obtained regions are also given
in Section III. Section IV presents the various definitions and properties related to UCEs used throughout this work
(with proofs relegated to Section VI). Section V contains the proofs of our main secrecy-capacity results based on
the technical background supplied in Section IV. Finally, Section VII summarizes the main results and insights of
this work.
II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
We use the following notations. The set of natural numbers (which does not include 0) is denoted by N, while
R are the reals. We further define R+ , {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0}. Given two real numbers a, b, we denote by [a : b] the
set of integers
{
n ∈ N∣∣⌈a⌉ ≤ n ≤ ⌊b⌋}; when a = 1 we use the shorthand [b]. Calligraphic letters denote sets,
e.g., X , while |X | stands for the cardinality of X . Xn denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of X . An element
of Xn is denoted by xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn); whenever the dimension n is clear from the context, vectors (or
sequences) are denoted by boldface letters, e.g., x. The transpose and the Euclidean norm of x are denoted by x⊤
and ‖x‖, respectively. Random variables are denoted by uppercase letters, e.g., X , with similar conventions for
random vectors. All the random variables considered in this work are real valued.
Probability density functions (PDFs) are denoted by the lowercase letters p or q, with a subscript that identifies
the random variable and its possible conditioning. For example, for two jointly continuous random vectorsX and Y,
let pX, pX,Y and pX|Y denote, respectively, the PDF of X, the joint PDF of (X,Y) and the conditional PDF of X
given Y. Expressions such as pX,Y = pXpY |X are to be understood pointwise, i.e., pX,Y (x, y) = pX(x)pY |X(y|x),
for all (x, y) ∈ X ×Y . Accordingly, when three random variables X , Y and Z satisfy pX|Y,Z = pX|Y , they form a
Markov chain, which we denote by X−Y −Z . The subscripts of a PDF are omitted if its arguments are lowercase
versions of the corresponding random variables. General (i.e., not necessarily continuous) probability distributions
are denoted by the uppercase letters P and Q, with conventions similar to those used for PDFs. The expectation of
a random variable X is EX . When a random variable X is normally distributed we write X ∼ N (µ, σ2), where
µ = EX is the expectation of X and σ2 = var(X) is its variance. Similarly, an n-dimensional Gaussian distribution
of dimension is defined by the expectation µ = EX ∈ Rn and the covariance matrix K = E[(X− µ)(X− µ)⊤],
for which we write X ∼ N (µ,K). Generally, non-italic capital letters, e.g., A, denote matrices. We use A  0
5to indicate that a matrix A is positive semi-definite, while A  B denotes “less than or equal to” in the positive
semi-definite ordering, i.e., B−A  0. The determinant of a square matrix A is designated by |A|.
Definition 1 (Upper Concave Envelope) Let f : D → R be a function defined on a convex set D. The UCE
Cf : D → R of f is the pointwise smallest concave function such that (Cf)(x) ≥ f(x), ∀x ∈ D.
Another representation of the UCE Cf of f relies on the supporting hyperplanes of f . Namely, for any x ∈ D,
we have
(
Cf
)
(x) = sup
V : EV=x
Ef(V ).
B. Problem Definition
The outputs of a MIMO Gaussian BC at the ith channel use are:
Yj(i) = GjX(i) + Zj(i), j = 1, 2, i ∈ [n], (1)
where G1,G2 ∈ Rt×t are channel gain matrices (assumed to be known to all parties),
{
Zj(i)
}
i∈[n]
, for j = 1, 2, is
an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence of Gaussian random vectors taking values in Rt×1. For
each j = 1, 2 and i ∈ [n], the elements of Zj(i) =
[
Zj,1(i) Zj,2(i) . . . Zj,t(i)
]⊤
are also i.i.d. Gaussian random
variables, whose expected values and variance are specified by the parameters of the normal distribution of Zj(i).
The input sequence
{
X(i)
}
i∈[n]
is is subject to the covariance constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[
X(i)X(i)⊤
]  K, (2)
where K  0.
Remark 1 (Assumptions) We make the following assumptions on the channel gain matrices and the noise statistics:
1) G1 and G2 are square and invertible. The analysis in this work relies on showing that certain inner and
outer bounds on the secrecy-capacity region coincide. These bounds are characterized in terms of mutual
information terms between the channel input (or some auxiliary random variables) and the channel outputs.
The mutual information terms, and hence the inner and outer bounds, are continuous functions of the channel
gain matrices. For square matrices, recall that the set of invertible matrices is a dense open set in the set of all
t×t matrices. Therefore, by continuity of the bounds, the inner and outer bounds coincide for all channel gain
matrices. If G1 and G2 are not square, the singular value decomposition (SVD) allows rewriting the original
MIMO BC as a MIMO BC with square gain matrices (of size corresponding to the number of transmitting
antennas) using only reversible manipulations. These manipulations have no effect on the secrecy-capacity
region of the channel (see, e.g., [15, Section 5]).
2) For each j = 1, 2, the Gaussian noise vectors,
{
Zj(i)
}
i∈[n]
, are i.i.d. according to N (0, I), where I is
the t × t-identity matrix. This assumption is without loss of generality due to the following reasons: First,
the mean of the Gaussian noise does not affect the capacity region. Second, when the covariance matrix is
invertible, the noises can be whitened by multiplying (1) by another invertible matrix. On the other hand,
6if the covariance matrix is non-invertible, the communication scenario degenerates since a suitable linear
transformation converts the Gaussian channel into a noiseless channel with infinite capacity.
We study the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages (Fig. 1). The sender
communicates three messages (M0,M1,M2) over the MIMO Gaussian BC from (1). M0 is a common message
that is intended to both users, while Mj , for j = 1, 2, is delivered to user j only. The receivers are to recover their
intended messages with arbitrarily small error probability. Moreover, M1 is a confidential message that is to be
kept secret from User 2, which is formally described by the weak-secrecy requirement
1
n
I(M1;Y
n
2 ) −−−−→
n→∞
0, (3)
where n is the number of channel uses. In (3), the notation Yn2 ,
[
Y2(1) Y2(2) . . . Y2(n)
]⊤
is used, where
for each i ∈ [n], Y2(i) is the output vector (taking values in Rt) observed by User 2 at the ith channel instance.
For any covariance constraint K  0, the secrecy-capacity region CK is the closure of all achievable rate triples
(R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+, where achievability is defined in a standard manner (see, e.g., [22]).
Remark 2 (Weak versus Strong Secrecy) We set up the problem in term of the weak-secrecy metric (3), merely
because the general inner and outer bounds we use [23] were originally proven under this paradigm1. Nonetheless,
the results from [23] are readily upgraded to strong secrecy using the approach of Maurer and Wolf from [24],
while accounting for the channel being continuous in a manner similar to [25]. Since the focus of this paper is on
the optimality of Gaussian inputs and computable secrecy-capacity expressions, we do not dwell on the employed
notion of security.
III. SECRECY-CAPACITY RESULTS
A. MIMO Gaussian BCs with Private and Confidential Messages
The MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages but without a common message is defined
as in Section II-B, while setting R0 = 0. For any covariance constraint K  0, let CˆK be the corresponding
secrecy-capacity region, and for any 0  K⋆  K set the following shorthand notations:
rˆ1(K
⋆) ,
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G1K⋆G⊤1I + G2K⋆G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ (4a)
rˆ2(K
⋆) ,
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G2KG⊤2I + G2K⋆G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ . (4b)
Define also
CˆK(K⋆) ,

(R1, R2) ∈ R
2
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R1 ≤ rˆ1(K⋆)
R2 ≤ rˆ2(K⋆)

 . (5)
The following theorem characterizes CˆK.
1The work [23] derived bounds on the admissible rate region of a BC with privacy leakage constraints. Zero leakage corresponds to secrecy,
but since leakage can only be defined in terms of rate the resulting notion of security is weak-secrecy.
7Theorem 1 (Secrecy-Capacity without Common Message) The secrecy-capacity region CˆK of the MIMO Gaus-
sian BC with private and confidential messages under the covariance constraint (2) is
CˆK =
⋃
0K⋆K
CˆK(K⋆). (6)
The proof of Theorem 1 (given in Section V-A) shows that certain inner and outer bounds of the secrecy-capacity
region coincide, and that Gaussian inputs are optimal. First, we show that the boundary points of the outer bound
are an UCE of a function of the input distribution. Based on some properties of UCEs (see Sections IV-A and IV-B)
we deduce that a Gaussian input distribution maximizes the considered UCE. The secrecy-capacity region is then
characterized by evaluating the boundary points of the inner bound under a Gaussian input vector and showing that
they coincide with those of the outer bound.
Remark 3 (Interpretation of Optimal Secrecy Rates) The right-hand side (RHS) of (4a) is the secrecy-capacity
of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with input covariance K⋆, where User 1 serves as the legitimate party and User 2
as the eavesdropper. The RHS of (4b) is the capacity of the MIMO Gaussian point-to-point channel with input
covariance K − K⋆ and noise covariance I + K⋆. Thus, M1 being confidential forces User 1 to treat the second
user as an eavesdropper. Then, the transmission rate of M2 (to User 2) is maximized by consuming the remaining
power, while treating the signal of the first user as noise. The optimization over K⋆ corresponds to different choices
of user prioritization.
Remark 4 (Relation to Dirty-Paper Coding) As evident from the proof of Theorem 1 (see Proposition 8 in Section
V-A), the entire secrecy-capacity region CˆK is achieved by using DPC to cancel out the signal of the non-confidential
message M2 at Receiver 1 only. The other variant, i.e., DPC against the signal of the confidential message M1 at
Receiver 2, is unnecessary. This is in contrast to the situation without a secrecy requirement on M1 (namely, the
private message BC), for which the capacity region is exhausted by taking the convex hull of both variants (DPC
against M1 and DPC against M2).
Remark 5 (Relation to Common Message Case) Theorem 1 is a special case of the secrecy-capacity region of
the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages CK (given in Theorem 2). Nonetheless,
we separately state and prove Theorem 1 since it is used as an auxiliary result for the proof of Theorem 2, as it
implies the optimality of Gaussian inputs for a certain portion of CK. More specifically, when the private message
rate R2 is larger than the common message rate R0, the optimizing distribution of CK coincides with that of CˆK;
Theorem 1 shows that this distribution is Gaussian.
As a corollary of Theorem 1, we characterize the secrecy-capacity region under the average total power constraint.
This is a simple consequence of [15, Lemma 1].
Corollary 1 (Average Total Power Constraint) The secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with
8private and confidential messages under the average total power constraint
1
n
n∑
i=1
∥∥X(i)∥∥2 ≤ P, (7a)
is given by
CˆP =
⋃
0K: tr(K)≤P
CˆK. (7b)
Remark 6 (Computing Secrecy-Capacity Region) In general, it is hard to compute (6) and (7b) as they involve
non-convex matrix optimization problems. Nonetheless, in Section III-C we show how to convert (6) and (7b) into
a computationally efficient form based on matrix decomposition properties from [21]. The simplified optimization
problem is then used to illustrate the secrecy-capacity region under an average total power constraint CˆP on a
numerical example.
B. MIMO Gaussian BCs with Common, Private and Confidential Messages
To state the secrecy-capacity region CK of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential
messages as defined in Section II-B, we define
r
(j)
0 (K1,K2) ,
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣ I + GjKG
⊤
j
I + Gj(K1 +K2)G⊤j
∣∣∣∣∣ , j = 1, 2 (8a)
r1(K2) ,
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G1K2G⊤1I + G2K2G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ (8b)
r2(K1,K2) ,
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G2(K1 +K2)G⊤2I + G2K2G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ , (8c)
and set
CK(K1,K2) ,


(R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
R0 ≤ min
{
r
(1)
0 (K1,K2), r
(2)
0 (K1,K2)
}
R1 ≤ r1(K2)
R2 ≤ r2(K1,K2)


. (9)
Theorem 2 (Secrecy-Capacity with Common Message) The secrecy-capacity region CK of the MIMO Gaussian
BC with common, private and confidential messages under the covariance constraint (2) is
CK =
⋃
0K1,K2:
K1+K2K
CK(K1,K2). (10)
Theorem 2 is proven in Section V-B.
Remark 7 (Interpretation of Optimal Secrecy Rates) Our interpretation of the structure of CK is reminiscent
of Remark 3. First, (8b) indicates that User 1 achieves rates up to the secrecy-capacity of the MIMO Gaussian
WTC with input covariance K2. The 2nd user treats this signal as an additive Gaussian noise when decoding its
private message M2, which is transmitted using another (independent) Gaussian signal with covariance K1 (see
(8c)). According to (8a), the remaining portion of the total covariance matrix, that is, K− (K1+K2), is employed
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Fig. 2: Secrecy-capacity region under an average total power constraint of the MIMO Gaussian BC without a
common message, where: M1 is confidential and M2 is private (solid blue) vs. M1 and M2 are both confidential
(dashed red).
to encode the common message M0, which is decoded by each receiver while treating all other signals as noise.
As in the case without a common message, a layered coding scheme, when optimized over the choices of K1 and
K2, exhausts the entire secrecy-capacity region.
As before, Theorem 2 produces a characterization of the secrecy-capacity region under the average total power
constraint.
Corollary 2 (Average Total Power Constraint) The secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with
common, private and confidential messages under the average total power constraint (7a) is given by
CP =
⋃
0K: tr(K)≤P
CK. (11)
C. Numerical Example
We illustrate the secrecy-capacity region CˆP of the MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages
(without a common message) under an average total power constraint P (Corollary 1). The region is described in
(7b) as the union of all secrecy-capacity regions CˆK, each under a covariance constraint K  0 with tr(K) ≤ P .
However, CˆK itself is described as matrix optimization problems that is not convex in general, and is therefore,
hard to compute.
We overcome the computational inefficiency of CˆK by leveraging the decomposition proposed in [21, Equation
(10)]: Every positive semi-definite matrix K⋆ ∈ Rt×t with K⋆  K can be expressed as
K⋆ = K
1
2VDV⊤K
1
2
⊤
, (12)
where V ∈ Rt×t is a unitary matrix and D ∈ Rt×t is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal values are between 0 and
1. Since in the subsequent example the dimension is t = 2, a unitary matrix V is nothing but a rotation matrix,
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i.e., we set
V =

cos(θ) − sin(θ)
sin(θ) cos(θ)

 , θ ∈ [0, 2pi]. (13)
Running over all possible diagonal matrices D involves only two parameters, viz. the diagonal entries of D. Finally,
note that K
1
2 is any matrix B satisfying BB⊤ = K. Obviously, there are many such matrices (in fact if B satisfies
BB⊤ = K, then so does BU, for any unitary U). However, since the numerical calculation runs over all matrices V
from (13) anyway, any choice of B would do. Our simulation uses the Cholesky decomposition of K to calculate B.
The region CˆP is computed according to (7b), while noting that one may restrict the optimization domain to
positive semi-definite matrices K with tr(K) = P . This observation follows because for every K′ with tr(K′) =
pi < P , there is a K with tr(K) = P , such that
CˆK′ ⊆ CˆK. (14)
The matrix K is constructed by increasing the (1, 1)-th entry of K′ by P − pi, while all other entries of K′ remain
unchanged. The construction satisfies K′  K and the inclusion in (14) follows because fixing K⋆  K′  K and
replacing K′ with K in (4) does not alter (4a) and strictly increases (4b).
In the numerical example we set
G1 =

0.3 2.5
2.2 1.8

 , G2 =

1.3 1.2
1.5 3.9

 (15)
and P = 12. The secrecy-capacity region CˆP is given by the solid blue curve in Fig. 2. For comparison, the
secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with confidential messages [13] (i.e., when each user serves as
the eavesdropped of the message to the other user) is depicted by the dashed red curve. As expected, Fig. 2 shows
that imposing a secrecy constraint on M2 at the 1st receiver strictly shrinks the secrecy-capacity region. Although
in both regions the maximal value of R1 is the secrecy-capacity of the corresponding MIMO Gaussian WTC (see
(4a) and [13, Equation (4)]), the achievable values of R2 drop if M2 is also confidential.
IV. OPTIMALITY OF GAUSSIAN INPUTS VIA FACTORIZATION OF CONCAVE ENVELOPES
This section provides the mathematical background for characterizing the secrecy-capacity regions of the
considered MIMO Gaussian BC without and with a common message (Theorems 1 and 2). In the sequel we
define some generic functions and show that they are maximized by Gaussian distributions. These functions are
later used to describe the boundary points of certain outer bounds on the secrecy-capacity regions of interest. The
properties established in this section are leveraged to show that optimality is achieved by Gaussian inputs, and that
the resulting expressions are attainable by a corresponding inner bound.
Sections IV-A and IV-B focus on functions that are reminiscent of those studied in [16, Sections II-B and II-C].
Therefore, to avoid verbatim repetition of arguments from [16], we state some of the properties in Sections IV-A
11
and IV-B without proofs. The focus of Section IV-C is on a new function that was not considered in [16], the
properties of which we prove in full detail. All the proofs for this section are relegated to Section VI.
Establishing Gaussian inputs as maximizers relies on the notion of two-letter BCs [16, Section I-A], which is a
special case of a product BC (PBC).2
Definition 2 (Product BC) A PBC consists of a sender (X1,X2) and two receivers (Y11,Y12) and (Y21,Y22),
and is described by a conditional PDF of the form q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
.
A MIMO Gaussian PBC can be represented as
Y11
Y12

 =

G11 0
0 G12



X1
X2

+

Z11
Z12

 (16a)

Y21
Y22

 =

G21 0
0 G22



X1
X2

+

Z21
Z22

 , (16b)
where Z11,Z12,Z21,Z22 ∼ N (0, I) are i.i.d. and independent of (X1,X2). A two-letter version of a BC is a PBC
in which the components are identical, i.e., q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
= q
(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
. In all subsequent definitions and results,
the input covariance constraining matrix K  0 (see (2)) stays fixed.
A. Difference of Mutual Information Terms
Consider a BC qY1,Y2|X. For any η > 1, let s
q
η be a functional of X ∼ PX defined by
s
q
η(X) , I(X;Y2)− ηI(X;Y1). (17)
Remark 8 The definition of sqη(X) in (17) coincides with that of s
q
λ(X) , I(X;Y1) − λI(X;Y2) from [16,
Section II-B] (only differing in the ordering of the mutual information terms and the labeling of the parameter).
Accordingly, we restate and use some of the properties of sqη(X) established in [16] without providing proofs.
Additional attributes of sqη(X) that were not proven in [16] are rigorously derived.
For a pair of random variables (V,X) such that V −X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain, set
s
q
η(X|V ) , I(X;Y2|V )− ηI(X;Y1|V ), (18)
and define the UCE of sqη(X) as
S
q
η(X) ,
(
Cs
q
η
)
(X) = sup
PV |X:
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
s
q
η(X|V ). (19)
The second equality in (19) follows directly from Definition 1. For any discrete random variable V we also set
Sqη(X|V ) ,
∑
v P (v)S
q
η(X|V = v), and naturally extend this definition (merely an expectation) for an arbitrary V .
2Henceforth, we omit the time index i.
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Proposition 1 (Concave Envelopes Properties) The UCE Sqη satisfies:
1) If V −X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain, then Sqη(X|V ) ≤ Sqη(X).
2) If W − V −X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain, then Sqη(X|V,W ) = Sqη(X|V ).
3) Sqη(X) is convex in η inside (0, 2), for a fixed PX, and therefore it is continuous in η at η = 1.
3
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Section VI-A.
Definition 3 (Maximized Concave Envelope) For any MIMO Gaussian BC qY1,Y2|X, define
V qη (K) , sup
X: E[XX⊤]K
S
q
η(X) = sup
(V,X): E[XX⊤]K,
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
s
q
η(X|V ). (20)
We subsequently show that (20) is achieved by a Gaussian input distribution. At the heart of the proof is a
specific factorization property of the UCE Sqη. To formulate this property, we first extend S
q
η to PBCs. For a PBC
q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
we set,
s
q1×q2
η (X1,X2) , I(X1,X2;Y21,Y22)− ηI(X1,X2;Y11,Y12), (21)
and define the quantities sq1×q2η (X1,X2|V ), Sq1×q2η (X1,X2) and Sq1×q2η (X1,X2|V ) analogously to the definitions
of sqη(X|V ), Sqη(X) and Sqη(X|V ) from the above, respectively.
Proposition 2 (Factorization Property) For any PBC q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
, the following chain of inequal-
ities holds
S
q1×q2
η (X1,X2) ≤ Sq1η (X1|Y22) + Sq2η (X2|Y11) ≤ Sq1η (X1) + Sq2η (X2). (22)
The proof of Proposition 2 follows by repeating the steps in the proof of [16, Proposition 6], while switching the
roles of Y1 and Y2.
Theorem 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of Gaussian Maximizer) Let X ∼ N (0,K). There exists a decomposi-
tion X = X⋆ +X′, such that X⋆ and X′ are independent, X⋆ ∼ N (0,K⋆), X′ ∼ N (0,K−K⋆), where K⋆  K,
and Sqη(X) = s
q
η(X
⋆) = V qη (K). Furthermore, this decomposition (i.e., the covariance matrix K
⋆) is unique.
The proof of Theorem 3 is also omitted as it mimics the proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in [16].
B. Nested Upper Concave Envelopes
The function considered in this subsection is used to derive the secrecy-capacity region of the considered MIMO
Gaussian BC without a common message (see Section V-A).
For a BC qY1,Y2|X, η > 1, λ = (λ1, λ2), where λj > 0, j = 1, 2, and any X ∼ PX define
t
q
λ,η(X) , λ1I(X;Y1)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2) + λ1Sqη(X), (23)
3The crux of the 3rd property is the continuity of the UCE in η at η = 1, which can be established by considering any bounded, open interval
containing 1, and not necessarily (0, 2).
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where Sqη(X) is given by (19). As before, for a pair of random variables (V,X) for which V − X − (Y1,Y2)
forms a Markov chain, let
t
q
λ,η(X|V ) , λ1I(X;Y1|V )− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|V ) + λ1Sqη(X|V ), (24)
and set
T
q
λ,η(X) , C
(
t
q
λ,η(X)
)
= sup
PV |X:
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
t
q
λ,η(X|V ). (25)
Define T
q
λ,η(X|V ) ,
∑
v P (v)T
q
λ,η(X|V = v), for a V with a countable alphabet and consider its natural extension
when V is an arbitrary random variable.
Remark 9 (Nested Concave Envelopes Properties) Similarly to the properties of Sqη stated in Proposition 1, since
T
q
λ,η is concave in PX, Jensen’s inequality implies that T
q
λ,η(X|V ) ≤ Tqλ,η(X), for any (V,X) satisfying V −
X − (Y1,Y2). Moreover, if W − V − X forms a Markov chain, then Tqλ,η(X|W,V ) = Tqλ,η(X|V ), because
PX|W,V = PX|V . Finally, T
q
λ,η(X) is convex in η inside (0, 2), for a fixed PX, and therefore it is continuous as a
function of η at η = 1.
Definition 4 (Maximized Nested Concave Envelope) For any MIMO Gaussian BC qY1,Y2|X, define
Vˆ
q
λ,η(K) , sup
X: E[XX⊤]K
T
q
λ,η(X) = sup
(V,X): E[XX⊤]K,
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
t
q
λ,η(X|V ). (26)
Proposition 3 (Continuity of Maximal Value) For any λ as before, Vˆλ,η(K) is continuous in η at η = 1.
The proof of Proposition 3 follows by arguments similar to those in the proof of Property 3 of Proposition 1.
Namely, the continuity of Vˆλ,η(K) at η = 1 follows by verifying that Vˆλ,η(K) is convex in η inside (0, 2) and
using Proposition 17 from [26, Chapter 5].
As before, to state the factorization property for nested UCEs, we extend some of the preceding definitions to
PBCs. For a PBC q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
, we set
t
q1×q2
λ,η (X1,X2) = λ1I(X1,X2;Y11,Y12)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X1,X2;Y21,Y22) + λ1Sq1×q2η (X1,X2). (27)
Furthermore, define t
q1×q2
λ,η (X1,X2|V ), Tq1×q2λ,η (X1,X2) and Tq1×q2λ,η (X1,X2|V ) in a similar manner to tqλ,η(X|V ),
T
q
λ,η(X) and T
q
λ,η(X|V ), respectively. The following proposition states the Tq1×q2λ,η (X1,X2|V ) factorization
property of interest, which is used to prove the existence of a Gaussian maximizer for Vˆ
q
λ,η(K) from (26).
Proposition 4 (Factorization Property) For any PBC q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
, the following chain of inequal-
ities holds
T
q1×q2
λ,η (X1,X2) ≤ Tq1λ,η(X1|Y22) + Tq2λ,η(X2|Y11) ≤ Tq1λ,η(X1) + Tq2λ,η(X2) (28)
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Furthermore, if the PBC is Gaussian and a triple (V ⋆,X⋆1,X
⋆
2) satisfies
t
q1×q2
λ,η (X
⋆
1,X
⋆
2|V ⋆) = Tq1×q2λ,η (X⋆1,X⋆2) = Tq1λ,η(X⋆1) + Tq2λ,η(X⋆2), (29)
then X⋆1 − V ⋆ −X⋆2 and tqjλ,η(X⋆j |V ⋆) = Tqjλ,η(X⋆j ), for j = 1, 2.
See Section VI-B for the proof of Proposition 4. The existence of a Gaussian maximizer for Vˆ
q
λ,η(K) follows by
repeating the proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 in [16] with respect to our definition of T
q
λ,η. The existence is
stated in the following Theorem, which we give without proof.
Theorem 4 (Existence and Uniqueness of Gaussian Maximizer) Let X ∼ N (0,K). There exists a unique
decomposition X = X⋆1 + X
⋆
2 + X
′ into independent random variables (X⋆1,X
⋆
2,X
′), where X⋆j ∼ N (0,Kj),
j = 1, 2, and X′ ∼ N (0,K− (K1 +K2)
)
, K1 +K2  K, such that
T
q
λ,η(X) = t
q
λ,η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2) = Vˆ
q
λ,η(K) (30a)
S
q
η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2) = s
q
η(X
⋆
1) = V
q
η (K1 +K2). (30b)
C. Double-Nested Upper Concave Envelopes
The definitions and properties in this section are used to derive the secrecy-capacity region of the cooperative
BC with common, private and confidential messages (as defined in Section II-B). Let qY1,Y2|X, η > 1 be a BC,
λ0 = (λ0, λ1, λ2), where λj > 0 for j = 0, 1, 2 and λ0 > λ2, α ∈ [0, 1] and α¯ = 1− α. For any X ∼ PX define
f
q
λ0,α,η
(X) , (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X;Y2)− αλ0I(X;Y1) + Tqλ,η(X), (31)
where T
q
λ,η(X) is given by (25) and λ = (λ1, λ2).
For (V,X) that satisfy the Markov chain V −X−(Y1,Y2), we set fqλ0,α,η(X|V ) in an analogous manner to (24),
while F
q
λ0,α,η
, Cf
q
λ0,α,η
denotes the UCE of f
q
λ0,α,η
. We also set F
q
λ0,α,η
(X|V ) , ∑v P (v)Fqλ0,α,η(X|V = v)
for a discrete V and, as before, consider its natural extension in the case where V is arbitrary.
Remark 10 (Double-Nested Concave Envelopes Properties) The concavity of F
q
λ0,α,η
in PX and Jensen’s in-
equality imply that for any (V,X) with V −X− (Y1,Y2), it holds that Fqλ0,α,η(X|V ) ≤ F
q
λ0,α,η
(X). If the chain
W − V − X is Markov, then Fq
λ0,α,η
(X|W,V ) = Fq
λ0,α,η
(X|V ), because PX|W,V = PX|V . As a function of η,
F
q
λ0,α,η
(X) is convex inside (0, 2), for any fixed X, and is therefore continuous at η = 1.
Definition 5 (Maximized Double-Nested Concave Envelope) For any MIMO Gaussian BC qY1,Y2|X, define
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) , sup
X: E[XX⊤]K
F
q
λ0,α,η
(X) = sup
(V,X): E[XX⊤]K,
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
f
q
λ0,α,η
(X|V ). (32)
Remark 11 (Continuity of Maximal Value) As before, one readily verifies that as a function of η, V˜λ0,α,η(K) is
convex inside (0, 2), and deduce its continuity at η = 1.
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The above notions are once again extended to PBCs. Namely, for any PBC q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
, we set
f
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
(X1,X2) = (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X1,X2;Y21,Y22)− αλ0I(X1,X2;Y11,Y12) + Tq1×q2λ,η (X1,X2), (33)
and define f
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
(X1,X2|V ), Fq1×q2λ0,α,η(X1,X2) and F
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
(X1,X2|V ) as the natural extensions to the PBC
scenario of f
q
λ0,α,η
(X|V ), Fq
λ0,α,η
(X) and Fq
λ0,α,η
(X|V ) given above, respectively.
Moving forward, the factorization property of F
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
is stated in Proposition 5, while Proposition 6 establishes
the existence of its maximizer.
Proposition 5 (Factorization Property) For any PBC q
(1)
Y11,Y21|X1
× q(2)
Y12,Y22|X2
, the following chain of inequal-
ities holds
F
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
(X1,X2) ≤ Fq1λ0,α,η(X1|Y22) + F
q2
λ0,α,η
(X2|Y11) ≤ Fq1λ0,α,η(X1) + F
q2
λ0,α,η
(X2) (34)
Furthermore, if the PBC is Gaussian and a triple (V ⋆,X⋆1,X
⋆
2) satisfies
f
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
(X⋆1,X
⋆
2|V ⋆) = Fq1×q2λ0,α,η(X⋆1,X⋆2) = F
q1
λ0,α,η
(X⋆1) + F
q2
λ0,α,η
(X⋆2), (35)
then X⋆1 − V ⋆ −X⋆2 and fqjλ0,α,η(X⋆j |V ⋆) = F
qj
λ0,α,η
(X⋆j ), for j = 1, 2.
See Section VI-C for the proof of Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 (Existence of a Maximizer) There exists a pair (V ⋆,X⋆) with |V⋆| ≤ t(t+1)2 +1 and E
[
XX⊤
] 
K, such that
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆|V ⋆). (36)
Furthermore, one may assume that E[X⋆|V ⋆ = v⋆] = 0, for every v⋆ ∈ V⋆.
The existence of a maximizer and the cardinality bound on V⋆ are proven in Section VI-D. A zero conditional
expectation can be assumed because centering conditioned on each V ⋆ = v⋆ does not change the mutual information
terms and hence f
q
λ0,α,η
(X⋆2|V ⋆) remains unchanged as well. In addition, the centered versions of the input continues
to satisfy the covariance constraint.
To show that the distribution that achieves V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) is Gaussian, we use the invariance of fq
λ0,α,η
to rotation.
This invariance property is stated in the context of the next Proposition, which is proven in Section VI-E.
Proposition 7 (Invariance to Rotation) Let (V,X) ∼ P ⋆V,X attain V˜ qλ0,α,η(K), with |V| = m ≤
t(t+1)
2 + 1, and
let Xv be a centered random variable (zero mean) distributed according to the conditional PMF P
⋆
X|V=v. Let
(V1,X1, V2,X2) ∼ P ⋆V,X × P ⋆V,X be two i.i.d. copies of (V ⋆,X⋆). Define
V˜ = (V1, V2)
Xθ1
∣∣{V˜ = (v1, v2)} ∼ 1√
2
(Xv1 +Xv2)
Xθ2
∣∣{V˜ = (v1, v2)} ∼ 1√
2
(Xv1 −Xv2),
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where Xv1 and Xv2 are taken to be independent random variables, i.e., (Xv1 ,Xv2) ∼ P ⋆X|V=v1 × P ⋆X|V=v2 . Then
Xθ1 − V˜ −Xθ2 and V˜ qλ0,α,η(K) = f
q
λ0,α,η
(Xθj |V˜ ), for j = 1, 2.
The existence of a Gaussian Maximizer for V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) is stated next.
Theorem 5 (Existence of Gaussian Maximizer) There exists an X⋆ ∼ N (0,K⋆), where K⋆  K, such that
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆). Furthermore, the zero mean maximizer is unique.
See Section VI-F for the proof.
Corollary 3 (Gaussian Maximizer Properties) Let X ∼ N (0,K). There is a unique decomposition X = X⋆1 +
X⋆2 +X
⋆
3 +X
′ into independent random variables (X⋆1,X
⋆
2,X
⋆
3,X
′), where X⋆j ∼ N (0,Kj), for j = 1, 2, 3, and
X′ ∼ N (0,K− (K1 +K2 +K3)), with K1 +K2 +K3  K, such that
F
q
λ0,α,η
(X) = fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆1 +X
⋆
2 +X
⋆
3) = V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) (37a)
T
q
λ,η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2 +X
⋆
3) = t
q
λ,η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2) = Vˆ
q
λ,η(K1 +K2 +K3) (37b)
S
q
η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2) = s
q
η(X
⋆
1) = V
q
η (K1 +K2). (37c)
Corollary 3, which is a consequence of Theorem 5, is our main tool for characterizing the secrecy-capacity region
of the MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages. The proof of the Corollary is provided
in Section VI-G.
V. PROOFS OF SECRECY-CAPACITY RESULTS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We establish the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with private and confidential messages by
showing that certain outer bound and inner bounds match. In particular, we consider special cases of the inner and
outer bounds from Theorems 1 and 3 of [23], respectively. To state the bounds, let Cˆ denote the secrecy-capacity
region of the corresponding discrete-memoryless (DM) BC.
Bound 1 (Outer Bound) Let Oˆ be the closure of the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|V )− I(U ;Y2|V ) (38a)
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2) (38b)
over all (V, U)−X − (Y1, Y2). Then Cˆ ⊆ Oˆ.
Bound 2 (Inner Bound) Let Iˆ be the closure of the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;V )− I(U ;Y2|V ) (39a)
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2) (39b)
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over all (V, U)−X − (Y1, Y2). Then Iˆ ⊆ Cˆ.
The reader is referred to Appendix A for the proofs of Bounds 1 and 2. Let CˆK, OˆK and IˆK denote the secrecy-
capacity region, the outer bound and the inner bound for a MIMO Gaussian BC computed under a covariance input
constraint E
[
XX⊤
]  K. Accordingly, we have IˆK ⊆ CˆK ⊆ OˆK.
The opposite inclusion, i.e., OˆK ⊆ IˆK, is shown next. The regions IˆK and OˆK are closed, convex and bounded
subsets of the first quadrant, and therefore, are characterized by the intersection of their supporting hyperplanes.
Lemma 1 (Supporting Hyperplanes) The following are supporting hyperplanes of OˆK and IˆK:
R1 ≥ 0 , R1 ≤ HK1 , R2 ≥ 0 , R2 ≤ HK2 , (40)
where
HK1 , max
(V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
I(U ;Y1|V )− I(U ;Y2|V ) (41a)
HK2 , max
X: E[XX⊤]K
I(X;Y2). (41b)
Furthermore, (HK1 , 0) and (0,HK2 ) are boundary points of OˆK and IˆK.
Lemma 1 is proven in Appendix B. It shows that if we set R⋆1 , max
{
R1
∣∣(R1, 0) ∈ OˆK} and R⋆2 ,
max
{
R2
∣∣(0, R2) ∈ OˆK}, then (R⋆1, 0) and (0, R⋆2) are attainable in IˆK. Consequently, to show that the regions
coincide, it suffices to establish
max
(R1,R2)∈OˆK
λ1R1 + λ2R2 ≤ max
(R1,R2)∈IˆK
λ1R1 + λ2R2, (42)
for λ1, λ2 > 0. Observe that
max(R1,R2)∈OˆKλ1R1 + λ2R2
(a)
≤ sup
(V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|V )− I(U ;Y2|V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2)
(b)
= sup
(V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ1I(X;Y1|V )− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|V )
+ λ1
[
I(X;Y2|V, U)− I(X;Y1|V, U)
]
+ λ2I(X;Y2)
(c)
≤ sup
V−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ1I(X;Y1|V )− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|V ) + lim
η↓1
λ1S
q
η(X|V ) + λ2I(X;Y2)
≤ sup
E[XX⊤]K
λ2I(X;Y2) + sup
V−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
lim
η↓1
tλ,η(X|V )
(d)
= sup
E[XX⊤]K
λ2I(X;Y2) + sup
E[XX⊤]K
lim
η↓1
Tλ,η(X)
(e)
= sup
E[XX⊤]K
λ2I(X;Y2) + lim
η↓1
Vˆλ,η(K), (43)
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where:
(a) uses (38);
(b) is because (V, U)−X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain;
(c) follows by the definition of sqη(X|V ) and since conditioned on V , U −X − (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain,
i.e., it holds that PY1,Y2|V,U,X = PY1,Y2|X. Furthermore, (c) uses the continuity of S
q
η(X|V ) in η at η = 1 (see
Property 3 of Proposition 1), which implies that for any (V,X)
S
q
1(X|V ) , Sqlimη↓1 η(X|V ) = limη↓1 S
q
η(X|V );
(d) is by the definition of T
q
λ,η(X), the Markov relation V −X− (Y1,Y2), and because Tqλ,η(X) is continuous
in η at η = 1 (see Remark 9);
(e) follows by Proposition 3.
By Theorem 4, for every η > 1, there exist independent random variables X⋆1 ∼ N (0,K1), X⋆2 ∼ N (0,K2) and
X′ ∼ N (0,K − (K1 + K2)), K1 + K2  K, such that Vˆ qη (K) = tqλ,η(X⋆1 + X⋆2) and Sqη(X⋆1 + X⋆2) = sqη(X⋆1).
Moreover, setting X = X⋆1 + X
⋆
2 + X
′ maximizes λ2I(X;Y2) and attains Vˆ
q
η (K) simultaneously. In order to
conform to the notation in the bounds, let V ⋆ = X′. Taking the limit as η ↓ 1, we have
max(R1,R2)∈OˆKλ1R1 + λ2R2
≤ λ1I(X;Y1|V ⋆)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|V ⋆) + λ1
[
I(X;Y2|V ⋆,X⋆2)− I(X;Y2|V ⋆,X⋆2)
]
+ λ2I(X;Y2)
≤ λ1
[
I(X⋆2;Y1|V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|V ⋆)
]
+ λ2I(V
⋆;Y2). (44)
The following proposition is used to show that (44) is achievable within IˆK.
Proposition 8 (Partial Dirty-Paper Coding (P-DPC)) Fix a covariance matrix K and let X = X⋆1 +X
⋆
2 + V
⋆,
where X⋆1, X
⋆
2 and V are independent Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices K1, K2 and K− (K1+
K2), respectively, for some 0  K1,K2  K with K1 + K2  K. Let Yj = GjX + Zj , for j = 1, 2, where
Zj ∼ N (0, I) is independent of (X⋆1,X⋆2, V ⋆). Set U = X⋆2 + AV ⋆, where A = K2G˜⊤1
[
I + G˜1K2G˜
⊤
1
]−1
and
G˜1 =
[
I + G1K1G
⊤
1
]− 1
2
G1. Then
I(X⋆2;Y1|V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|V ⋆) = I(U⋆;Y1)− I(U⋆;V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|V ⋆). (45)
Proof: We first write
Y1 = G1X+ Z1
= G1(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2 + V
⋆) + Z1
= G1(X
⋆
2 + V
⋆) + (G1X
⋆
1 + Z1)
(a)
= G1X˜+ Z
′
1, (46)
where (a) follows by setting X˜ , X⋆2 + V
⋆ and Z′1 , G1X
⋆
1 + Z1. By the independence of X
⋆
1, X
⋆
2, V
⋆ and
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Z1, we have that X˜ and Z
′
1 are also independent. Moreover, Z
′
1 ∼ N
(
0, I + G1K1G
⊤
1
)
, where the covariance
matrix I+G1K1G
⊤
1 is diagonalizable (due to its symmetry) and invertible (because it is positive definite). Denoting
Σ , I + G1K1G
⊤
1 , gives
Σ = QΛQ⊤, (47)
where Q is a unitary matrix and Λ is diagonal, and furthermore Σ−
1
2 = QΛ−
1
2Q⊤. By defining Y˜1 = Σ
− 1
2Y1,
we have
Y˜1 = G˜1X˜+ Z˜1, (48)
where G˜1 = Σ
− 1
2G1, Z˜1 = Σ
− 1
2Z′1 and Z˜1 ∼ N (0, I). Setting U⋆ as above and invoking the classic Dirty-Paper
Coding Theorem (here we use the formulation from [16, Proposition 12]), we have
I(X˜; Y˜1|V ⋆) = I(U⋆; Y˜1)− (U⋆;V ⋆). (49)
Furthermore,
I(X⋆2;Y2|V ⋆) = I(X⋆2 +AV ⋆;Y2|V ⋆) = I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆). (50)
Note that Y1 7→ Σ− 12Y1 is an invertible mapping, and as such, preserves mutual information. We conclude the
proof as follows:
I(X⋆2;Y1|V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|V ⋆)
(a)
= I(X˜;Y1|V ⋆)− I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆)
(b)
= I(X˜; Y˜1|V ⋆)− I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆)
(c)
= I(U⋆; Y˜1)− I(U⋆;V ⋆)− I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆)
(d)
= I(U⋆;Y1)− I(U⋆;V ⋆)− I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆), (51)
where (a) is because X˜ = X⋆2 + V
⋆ and by (50), (b) and (d) follow since Y1 7→ Σ− 12Y1 preserves mutual
information, while (c) uses (49).
Inserting U⋆ as stated in Proposition 8 into the RHS of (44), we obtain
max
(R1,R2)∈OˆK
λ1R1 + λ2R2 ≤ λ1
[
I(X⋆2;Y1|V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|V ⋆)
]
+ λ2I(V
⋆;Y2)
= λ1
[
I(U⋆;Y1)− I(U⋆;V ⋆)− I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆)
]
+ λ2I(V
⋆;Y2)
(a)
≤ max
(R1,R2)∈IˆK
λ1R1 + λ2R2, (52)
where (a) follows since (U⋆, V ⋆) −X − (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain and E
[
XX⊤
]  K is satisfied, which
implies that the rate pair R1 = I(U
⋆;Y1) − I(U⋆;V ⋆) − I(U⋆;Y2|V ⋆) and R2 = I(V ⋆;Y2) belongs to IˆK.
Concluding, we see that IˆK = CˆK = OˆK, which characterizes the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian
BC with private and confidential messages.
Furthermore, equality (and hence the extreme points of CˆK) is achieved by Gaussian inputs as stated in Proposition
8, thus making the region computable. By evaluating IˆK (or, equivalently OˆK) with respect to this input distribution,
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we describe the secrecy-capacity region CˆK as the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying:
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G1(K1 +K2)G⊤1I + G1K1G⊤1
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ I + G2(K1 +K2)G⊤2I + G2K1G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ (53a)
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G2KG⊤2I + G2(K1 +K2)G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ , (53b)
where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices K1,K2, such that K1+K2  K. We further simplify (53)
by noting that the RHS of (53a) is the secrecy-capacity of the MIMO Gaussian WTC as derived in [16, Appendix
III], which is maximized by setting K1 = 0 (see [7]–[9]). Further note that K1 = 0 cannot decrease the RHS of
(53b). Thus, by relabeling K2 , K
⋆ we establish (6).
B. Proof of Theorem 2
As in the case without a common message, the secrecy-capacity region CK is derived by showing that certain
outer bound and inner bounds on CK coincide. Denoting by C the region of the DM-BC with common, private and
confidential messages, we bound it as follows.
Bound 3 (Outer Bound) Let O be the closure of the union of rate triples (R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R0 ≤ min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(54a)
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W,V )− I(U ;Y2|W,V ) (54b)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2|W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(54c)
over all (W,V, U)−X − (Y1, Y2). Then C ⊆ O.
Bound 4 (Inner Bound) Let I be the closure of the union of rate triples (R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R0 ≤ min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(55a)
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V ) (55b)
R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2|W ) (55c)
over all (W,V, U)−X − (Y1, Y2). Then I ⊆ C.
The proofs of Bounds 3 and 4 are relegated to Appendix A. Denoting by OK and IK the adaptations of Bounds
3 and 4 to a MIMO Gaussian BC with a covariance input constraint E
[
XX⊤
]  K, we have IK ⊆ CK ⊆ OK.
Next, we use the factorization of concave envelopes method to show that the opposite inclusion OK ⊆ IK
also holds. Given the supporting hyperplanes characterization of bounded and closed convex sets, using a similar
reasoning as in Section V-A (see Lemma 1), it suffices to study max(R0,R1,R2)∈CK λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2, for
λj > 0, j = 1, 2, 3. Further note that it suffices to restrict attention to the case where λ0 > λ2. This follows from
the following observation: If a rate triple (R0, R1, R2) is in CK then so does the triple (0, R1, R2+R0), since one
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may always treat the common message as part of the (non-confidential) private message to Receiver 2. Assuming
λ0 ≤ λ2, we have
λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2 ≤ 0 ·R0 + λ1R1 + λ2(R0 +R2), (56)
and therefore,
max
(R0,R1,R2)∈CK
λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2 = max
(0,R1,R2)∈CK
λ1R1 + λ2R2 = max
(R1,R2)∈CˆK
λ1R1 + λ2R2, (57)
where CˆK is the secrecy-capacity region without a common message that was characterized in Section III-A.
Hence, it suffices to show that for all λj > 0, j = 1, 2, 3, with λ0 > λ2, we have
max
(R0,R1,R2)∈OK
λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2 ≤ max
(R0,R1,R2)∈IK
λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2. (58)
Now, for any α ∈ [0, 1] set α¯ = 1− α, and consider the following.
max(R0,R1,R2)∈OKλ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2
(a)
≤ sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W,V )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )
(b)
= sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2) + (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X;Y2|W )− αλ0I(X;Y1|W )
+ λ1I(X;Y1|W,V )− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|W,V )
+ λ1I(X;Y2|W,V, U)− λ1I(X;Y1|W,V, U)
(c)
≤ sup
(W,V )−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2) + (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X;Y2|W )− αλ0I(X;Y1|W )
+ λ1I(X;Y1|W,V )− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|W,V ) + lim
η↓1
λ1S
q
η(X|W,V )
(d)
≤ sup
W−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2)
+ (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X;Y2|W )− αλ0I(X;Y1|W ) + lim
η↓1
T
q
λ,η(X|W )
≤ sup
E[XX⊤]K
αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2) + sup
W−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
lim
η↓1
f
q
λ0,α,η
(X|W )
(e)
≤ sup
E[XX⊤]K
αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2) + sup
E[XX⊤]K
lim
η↓1
F
q
λ0,α,η
(X)
(f)
≤ sup
E[XX⊤]K
αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2) + lim
η↓1
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K), (59)
where:
(a) is by (54);
(b) follows because (W,V, U)−X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain;
(c) is by the definition of Sqη(X|W,V ) since conditioned on (W,V ), U −X − (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain,
and because Sqη(X|V,W ) is continuous in η at η = 1 (Property 3 of Proposition 1);
(d) follows by the definition of T
q
λ,η(X|W ) since conditioned on V , W −X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain.
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Furthermore, the continuity of T
q
λ,η(X|W ) in η at η = 1 (see Remark 9) is also exploited;
(e) is by the definition of F
q
λ0,α,η
(X) (while noting that W −X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain), and because
F
q
λ,η(X) is continuous at η = 1 (Remark 10);
(f) makes use of the continuity argument from Remark 11.
Recall that for any η > 1, λj > 0, for j = 0, 1, 2, and λ0 > λ2, Corollary 3 implies that there exist independent
random variables X⋆j ∼ N (0,Kj), j = 1, 2, 3, and X′ ∼ N
(
0,K − (K1 + K2 + K3)
)
, such that (37) is satisfied.
Furthermore, setting X = X⋆1 + X
⋆
2 + X
⋆
3 + X
′ not only attains V˜ qη (K), but it also simultaneously maximizes
αλ0I(X;Y1) and α¯λ0I(X;Y2). Relabeling W
⋆ = X′ and V ⋆ = X⋆3 while taking the limit as η ↓ 1, we have
max
(R0,R1,R2)∈OK
λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2
≤ αλ0I(X;Y1) + α¯λ0I(X;Y2) + (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X;Y2|W ⋆)− αλ0I(X;Y1|W ⋆)
+ λ1I(X;Y1|W ⋆, V ⋆)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2|W ⋆, V ⋆) + λ1I(X;Y2|W ⋆, V ⋆,X⋆2)− λ1I(X;Y1|W ⋆, V ⋆,X⋆2)
≤ λ0
[
αI(W ⋆;Y1) + α¯I(W
⋆;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(X⋆2;Y1|W ⋆, V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|W ⋆, V ⋆)
]
+ λ2I(V
⋆;Y2|W ⋆). (60)
Using Proposition 8, we set U = X⋆2 + A˜V
⋆ as before and obtain
I(X⋆2;Y1|W ⋆, V ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|W ⋆, V ⋆) = I(U⋆;Y1|W ⋆)− I(U⋆;V ⋆|W ⋆)− I(X⋆2;Y2|W ⋆, V ⋆). (61)
Inserting (61) into (60), yields
max(R0,R1,R2)∈OKλ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2
≤ λ0
[
αI(W ⋆;Y1) + α¯I(W
⋆;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U⋆;Y1|W ⋆)− I(U⋆;V ⋆|W ⋆)− I(U⋆;Y2|W ⋆, V ⋆)
]
+ λ2I(V
⋆;Y2|W ⋆)
≤ sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )
. (62)
Since (62) holds for all α ∈ [0, 1], we have
max(R0,R1,R2)∈OKλ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2
≤ min
α∈[0,1]
sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )
.
(63)
Having (63), the desired equality OK = IK is a consequence of the following Proposition 4.
4Proposition 9 bears strong resemblance to Proposition 13 from [16] that was originally established in [27]
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Proposition 9 (Max-Min Interchanging) The following max-min interchanging holds
min
α∈[0,1]
sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )
= sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
min
α∈[0,1]
λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )
= sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ0 ·min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W ).
(64)
The proof of Proposition 9 is given in Appendix D. Now, noting that (W,V, U)−X− (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov
chain and E
[
XX⊤
]  K, we see that the triple
R0 = min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
R1 = I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
R2 = I(V ;Y2|W )
is inside the inner bound IK. Hence
max(R0,R1,R2)∈OKλ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2
≤ sup
(W,V,U)−X−(Y1,Y2):
E[XX⊤]K
λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )
≤ max
(R0,R1,R2)∈IK
λ0R0 + λ1R1 + λ2R2, (65)
which implies that IˆK = CˆK = OˆK and characterizes the secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with
common, private and confidential messages.
To obtain the description of CK stated in (10), note that when λ0 > λ2, equality (and hence the extreme points
of CK) is achieved by setting
X = X⋆1 +X
⋆
2 + V
⋆ +W ⋆, (66)
where X⋆j ∼ N (0,Kj), j = 1, 2, V ⋆ ∼ N (0,K3) and W ⋆ ∼ N
(
0,K− (K1+K2+K3)
)
are independent of each
other, and U = X⋆2+A˜V
⋆, where A˜ is the P-DPC matrix from Proposition 8. For the case when λ0 ≤ λ2, (56)-(57)
imply that the boundary-achieving input distribution corresponds to the one that achieves the secrecy-capacity region
when there is no common message (see Section V-A). Setting K3 = K − (K1 + K2) recovers the optimal input
distribution for the case without common message.
By evaluating IK (or, equivalently OK) with respect to (66), we characterize the secrecy-capacity region CK as
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the union of rate triples (R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R0 ≤ min
{
1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G1KG⊤1I + G1(K1 +K2 +K3)G⊤1
∣∣∣∣ , 12 log
∣∣∣∣ I + G1KG⊤1I + G1(K1 +K2 +K3)G⊤1
∣∣∣∣
}
(67a)
R1 ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G1(K1 +K2)G⊤1I + G1K1G⊤1
∣∣∣∣− 12 log
∣∣∣∣ I + G2(K1 +K2)G⊤2I + G2K1G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ (67b)
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
∣∣∣∣ I + G2(K1 +K2 +K3)G⊤2I + G2(K1 +K2)G⊤2
∣∣∣∣ , (67c)
where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices K1,K2,K3, such that K1 +K2 +K3  K.
The region from (67) is further simplified using reasoning similar to this from Section V-A. First, (67b) indicates
that the signal to User 1 is a sum of two independent zero mean Gaussian random vector with covariance K1 and
K2. The signal that corresponds to K2 carries the confidential message M1, while the K1 signal is an artificial
noise sent (on purpose) to confuse User 2 (which serves as an eavesdropper of M1). The lack of structure in the
artificial noise adds to the noise floor at both receivers (see also [13, Remark 4]). However, since the RHS of (67b)
is the secrecy-capacity of the MIMO Gaussian WTC, it is maximized by setting K1 = 0. Furthermore, since in
both (67a) and (67c) K1 serves as noise (i.e., it is not used to encode any of the messages), setting K1 = 0 achieves
optimality. This is since K1 = 0 corresponds to revealing the K1 signal to both receivers, which can only increase
the transmission rates. Taking K1 = 0 and recasting K3 as K1, recovers (10).
VI. PROOFS OF UPPER CONCAVE ENVELOPES PROPERTIES
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Property 1 follows by Jensen’s inequality since Sqη is concave in PX, while for Property 2 we use the fact that
PX|W,V = PX|V . To prove Property 3, fix PX and let η1, η2 ∈ (0, 2), α ∈ [0, 1] and α¯ = 1− α. Observe that
S
q
αη1+α¯η2(X) = sup
PV |X:
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
I(X;Y2|V )− (αη1 + α¯η2)I(X;Y1|V )
≤ α · sup
PV |X:
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
I(X;Y2|V )− η1I(X;Y1|V ) + α¯ · sup
PV |X:
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
I(X;Y2|V )− η2I(X;Y1|V )
= αSqη1 (X) + α¯S
q
η2
(X).
Clearly, Sqη(X) is also bounded for every η ∈ (0, 2) and by invoking Proposition 17 from [26, Chapter 5], we have
that Sqη(X) is continuous inside every closed subinterval of (0, 2), and in particular, at η = 1.
B. Proof of Proposition 4
Let V − (X1,X2)− (Y11,Y12,Y21,Y22) form a Markov chain. We have,
t
q1×q2
λ,η (X1,X2|V )
= λ1I(X1,X2;Y11,Y12|V )− (λ1 + λ2)I(X1,X2;Y21,Y22|V ) + λ1Sq1×q2η (X1,X2|V )
= λ1
[
I(X1,X2;Y11|V ) + I(X1,X2;Y12|V,Y11)
]
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− (λ1 + λ2)
[
I(X1,X2;Y22|V ) + I(X1,X2;Y21|V,Y22)
]
+ λ1S
q1×q2
η (X1,X2|V )
(a)
= λ1
[
I(X1;Y11|V,Y22) + I(X2;Y12|V,Y11) + I(Y11;Y22|Y11)
]
− (λ1 + λ2)
[
I(X2;Y22|V,Y11) + I(X1;Y21|V,Y22) + I(Y11;Y22|V )
]
+ λ1S
q1×q2
η (X1,X2|V )
(b)
≤ λ1I(X1;Y11|V,Y22)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X1;Y21|V,Y22) + λ1Sq1η (X1|V,Y22)
+ λ1I(X2;Y12|V,Y11)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X2;Y22|V,Y11) + λ1Sq2η (X2|V,Y11)− λ2I(Y11;Y22|V )
(c)
≤ Tq1
λ,η(X1|Y22) + Tq2λ,η(X2|Y11)− λ2I(Y11;Y22|V )
(d)
≤ Tq1
λ,η(X1) + T
q2
λ,η(X2)− λ2I(Y11;Y22|V )
≤ Tq1
λ,η(X1) + T
q2
λ,η(X2), (68)
where:
(a) is since given V we have the Markov chain (Y11,Y21)−X1 −X2 − (Y12,Y22);
(b) follows from Proposition 2 by the definition of Sqη(·|·);
(c) is because (V,Y22)−X1 − (Y11,Y21) and (V,Y11)−X2 − (Y12,Y22) form Markov chains;
(d) follows by Remark 9 due to the Markov chains Y22 −X1 − (Y11,Y21) and Y11 −X2 − (Y12,Y22).
Now for (V ⋆,X⋆1,X
⋆
2), an end-to-end equality holds in (68). In particular, this implies that I(Y
⋆
11;Y
⋆
22|V ⋆) = 0,
i.e., that Y⋆11 − V ⋆ −Y⋆22 forms a Markov chain. By Proposition 2 in [16], we have that X⋆1 − V ⋆ −X⋆2, which
further implies the Markov chain
(Y⋆11,Y
⋆
21)−X⋆1 − V ⋆ −X⋆2 − (Y⋆12,Y⋆22). (69)
The end-to-end equality in (68) also gives
T
q1
λ,η(X
⋆
1) = λ1I(X
⋆
1;Y
⋆
11|V ⋆,Y⋆22)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X⋆1;Y⋆21|V ⋆,Y⋆22) + λ1Sq1η (X⋆1|V ⋆,Y⋆22)
(a)
= λ1I(X
⋆
1;Y
⋆
11|V ⋆)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X⋆1;Y⋆21|V ⋆) + λ1Sq1η (X⋆1|V ⋆), (70)
where (a) follows because (69) implies that the chain Y⋆22 − V ⋆ −X⋆1 − (Y⋆11,Y⋆21) is Markov. Similarly, it can
be shown that T
q2
λ,η(X
⋆
2) = t
q2
λ,η(X
⋆
2|V ⋆).
C. Proof of Proposition 5
Let V − (X1,X2)− (Y11,Y12,Y21,Y22) be a Markov chain. We have,
f
q1×q2
λ0,α,η
(X1,X2|V )
= (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X1,X2;Y21,Y22)− αλ0I(X1,X2;Y11,Y12) + Tq1×q2λ,η (X1,X2|V )
(a)
= (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X1;Y21|V,Y22)− αλ0I(X1;Y11|V,Y22)− αλ0I(Y11;Y22|V )
+ (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X2;Y22|V,Y11)− αλ0I(X2;Y21|V,Y11) + (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(Y11;Y22|V ) + Tq1×q2λ,η (X1,X2|V )
(b)
≤ (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X1;Y21|V,Y22)− αλ0I(X1;Y11|V,Y22) + Tq1λ,η(X1|V,Y22)
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+ (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X2;Y22|V,Y11)− αλ0I(X2;Y21|V,Y11) + Tq2λ,η(X2|V,Y11)− (λ0 − λ2)I(Y11;Y22|V )
(c)
≤ Fq1
λ0,α,η
(X1|Y22) + Fq2λ0,α,η(X2|Y11)− (λ0 − λ2)I(Y11;Y22|V )
(d)
≤ Fq1
λ0,α,η
(X1) + F
q2
λ0,α,η
(X2)− (λ0 − λ2)I(Y11;Y22|V )
≤ Fq1
λ0,α,η
(X1) + F
q2
λ0,α,η
(X2), (71)
where:
(a) is similar to step (a) in the proof of Proposition 4;
(b) uses Proposition 4 and the definition of T
q
λ,η(·|·);
(c) is because (V,Y22)−X1 − (Y11,Y21) and (V,Y11)−X2 − (Y12,Y22) form Markov chains;
(d) follows by Remark 10 due to the Markov chains Y22 −X1 − (Y11,Y21) and Y11 −X2 − (Y12,Y22).
For (V ⋆,X⋆1,X
⋆
2) that satisfy (35), an end-to-end equality holds in (71), implying that I(Y
⋆
11;Y
⋆
22|V ⋆) = 0.
Invoking Proposition 2 from [16], we deduce that X⋆1 −V ⋆−X⋆2 forms a Markov chain, which further implies the
Markov chain
(Y⋆11,Y
⋆
21)−X⋆1 − V ⋆ −X⋆2 − (Y⋆12,Y⋆22). (72)
By the end-to-end equality in (68), we also have
F
q1
λ0,α,η
(X⋆1) = (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X⋆1;Y⋆21|V ⋆,Y⋆22)− αλ0I(X⋆1;Y⋆11|V ⋆,Y⋆22) + Tq1λ,α,η(X⋆1|V ⋆,Y⋆22)
(a)
= (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X⋆1;Y⋆21|V ⋆)− αλ0I(X⋆1;Y⋆11|V ⋆) + Tq1λ,α,η(X⋆1|V ⋆), (73)
where (a) uses (72), which implies that Y⋆22 − V ⋆ −X⋆1 − (Y⋆11,Y⋆21) forms a Markov chain. Similarly, it can be
shown that F
q2
λ0,α,η
(X⋆2) = f
q2
λ0,α,η
(X⋆2|V ⋆).
D. Proof of Proposition 6
A key arguments in the proof of Proposition 6 is the continuity of the nested UCE T
q
λ,η(X) =
(
Ct
q
λ,η
)
(X) in
PX. We shall establish this continuity using Proposition 21 from [16], which we reproduced as follows.
Proposition 10 (Boundedness and Continuity of UCE) Consider the space of all Borel probability distributions
on Rt endowed with the topology induced by weak convergence.5 Let
{
Xn
}
n∈N
be a sequence of random variable
that satisfies the following two properties: (i) ∃ p > 1, B ∈ R such that E‖Xn‖p ≤ B, ∀n ∈ N (i.e., the sequence
has a uniformly bounded pth moment); (ii) Xn
D−−−−→
n→∞
X⋆. If g : Rt → R is a bounded real-valued function that
satisfies g(Xn) −−−−→
n→∞
g(X⋆), then its UCE G = Cg is bounded and satisfies G(Xn) −−−−→
n→∞
G(X⋆).
Before proving Proposition 6 at the end of this subsection, we first verify that Proposition 10 applies to T
q
λ,η(X).
This is done by showing that t
q
λ,η(X) is bounded and continuous, as stated in the subsequent Lemma 2 and 3. The
5A sequence
{
Xn
}
n∈N
of real-valued random variables is said to converge weakly or, equivalently, converge in distribution to a random
variable X if limn→∞ FXn (x) = F (x), for every x ∈ R for which FX is continuous, where FXn and FX are the cumulative distribution
functions of Xn and X , respectively. This notion of convergence is denoted by Xn
D
−−−−→
n→∞
X
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lemmas are proven, respectively, in Appendices C-A and C-B.
Lemma 2 (Boundedness of Nested Concave Envelopes) For η > 1 and λ1, λ2 > 0 there is a Bλ,η ∈ R, such
that t
q
λ,η(X) ≤ Bλ,η, for all PX.
Lemma 3 (Continuity of Nested Concave Envelopes) Consider the space of all Borel probability distributions
on Rt endowed with the topology induced by weak convergence and let
{
Xn
}
n∈N
be a sequence of random variable
that satisfies the following two properties: (i) ∃ p > 1, B ∈ R such that E‖Xn‖p ≤ B, ∀n; (ii) Xn D−−−−→
n→∞
X⋆.
Then t
q
λ,η(Xn) −−−−→n→∞ t
q
λ,η(X
⋆).
Based on Lemmas 2 and 3, Proposition 21 from [16] states that T
q
λ,η(Xn) is bounded and that it satisfies
T
q
λ,η(Xn) −−−−→n→∞ T
q
λ,η(X
⋆). The existence of a unique maximizer of V˜λ0,α,η(K) is established as follows. Let
Kˆ  0 and define
v˜λ0,α,η(Kˆ) , sup
X: E[XX⊤]=Kˆ
fλ0,α,η(X)
= sup
X: E[XX⊤]=Kˆ
(λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X;Y2)− αλ0I(X;Y1) + Tqλ,η(X). (74)
Let
{
Xn
}
n∈N
be a sequence of random variables with E
[
XnX
⊤
n
]
= Kˆ, such that fλ0,α,η(Xn) ↑ v˜λ0,α,η(Kˆ),
as n → ∞. By [16, Proposition 17] and since E[XnX⊤n ] = Kˆ for every n ∈ N, we have that {Xn}n∈N is a
tight sequence6, and that there exist an X⋆
Kˆ
and a convergent subsequence
{
Xnm
}
m∈N
such that Xnm
D−−−−→
m→∞
X⋆
Kˆ
. Invoking [16, Proposition 18] once more we have that h (Yj,nm) −−−−→
m→∞
h
(
Y⋆
j,Kˆ
)
, for j = 1, 2, where
Y1,nm ,Y2,nm ,Y
⋆
1,Kˆ
and Y⋆
2,Kˆ
are the corresponding outputs. Thus,
fλ0,α,η(X
⋆
Kˆ
) = v˜λ0,α,η(Kˆ). (75)
By the definition of V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K), we write
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = sup
(V,X): E[XX⊤]K,
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
f
q
λ0,α,η
(X|V ) = sup
(V,X): E[XX⊤]K,
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
∑
v
P (v)fq
λ0,α,η
(X|V = v). (76)
Since V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) is a convex combination as above, to obtain the maximizer subject to the covariance constraint
it suffices to restrict attention to the family of maximizers X⋆
Kˆ
, for K  0. Thus,
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = sup
{αi},{Kˆi}: αi≥0∑
i αi=1,
∑
i αiKˆiK
∑
i
αiv˜
q
λ0,α,η
(Kˆ). (77)
It takes
t(t+1)
2 constraints to preserve the covariance matrix (due to its symmetry) and one other constraint to
preserve
∑
i αiv˜
q
λ0,α,η
(Kˆ). Hence, by using the Bunt-Carathedory theorem [28], we can restrict ourselves to convex
6As defined in [16], a sequence of random variables
{
Xn
}
n∈N
taking values in Rt is tight if for every ǫ > 0 there exists a compact set
Cǫ ⊂ R
t, such that P
(
Xn /∈ Cǫ
)
≤ ǫ, ∀n ∈ N.
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combinations of at most m ,
t(t+1)
2 + 1 points, i.e.,
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = sup
{αi},{Kˆi}: αi≥0∑m
i=1 αi=1,
∑m
i=1 αiKˆiK
m∑
i=1
αiv˜
q
λ0,α,η
(Kˆ). (78)
Consider any sequence of convex combinations
{{
α
(n)
i
}
i∈[m]
,
{
K
(n)
i
}
i∈[m]
}
n∈N
that approaches the supremum
as n → ∞. The compactness of the m-dimensional simplex implies that α(n)i −−−−→n→∞ α
⋆
i , for all i ∈ [m].
Furthermore, we have the following property of the limiting points α⋆i ; see Appendix C-C for the proof.
Lemma 4 For any i ∈ [m], if α⋆i = 0 then α(n)i v˜qλ0,α,η
(
K
(n)
i
) −−−−→
n→∞
0.
Based on Lemma 4, we assume that α⋆ , mini∈[m] α
⋆
i > 0, which implies that K
(n)
i  2α⋆K uniformly in
i ∈ [m], for large enough values of n. Hence, for each i ∈ [m] we can find a convergent subsequence {K(nk)i }k∈N,
such that K
(nk)
i −−−−→
k→∞
K⋆i . Putting these together, we have
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) =
m∑
i=1
α⋆i v˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K⋆i ), (79)
i.e., one can always find a pair of random variables (V ⋆,X⋆) with |V⋆| ≤ t(t+1)2 + 1, such that V˜ qλ0,α,η(K) =
f
q
λ0,α,η
(X⋆|V ⋆).
E. Proof of Proposition 7
Denote qY1,Y2|X , q and consider the two-letter BC q(y11,y21|x1)× q(y12,y22|x2). We have
2V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K)
(a)
= fq
λ0,α,η
(X1|V1) + fqλ0,α,η(X2|V2)
(b)
= fq×q
λ0,α,η
(X1,X2|V1, V2)
(c)
= fq×q
λ0,α,η
(Xθ1 ,Xθ2 |V˜ )
(d)
≤ Fq×q
λ0,α,η
(Xθ1 ,Xθ2)
(e)
≤ Fq
λ0,α,η
(Xθ1) + F
q
λ0,α,η
(Xθ2)
(f)
≤ V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K) + V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K) = 2V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K), (80)
where:
(a) is because P ⋆V,X achieves V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K);
(b) uses the independence of (V1,X1) and (V2,X2);
(c) is a consequence of [16, Proposition 1] (namely, the invariance with respect to rotation of the mutual information
between the input and output of an additive Gaussian channel);
(d) follows by the definition of the double-nested UCE;
(e) uses Proposition 5;
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(f) is the definition of V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K), while noting that the independence of Xv1 and Xv2 , for every v1 6= v2 ∈ V ,
implies that
E
[
Xθ1X
⊤
θ1
]
= E
[
1
2
E
[
XV1X
⊤
V1
∣∣∣V˜ ]+ 1
2
E
[
XV2X
⊤
V2
∣∣∣V˜ ]
]
= E
[
Xθ2X
⊤
θ2
]
(81)
and
E
[
Xθ2X
⊤
θ2
]
=
∑
v1,v2
P ⋆V (v1)P
⋆
V (v2)
(
1
2
Kv1 +
1
2
Kv2
)
=
∑
v
P ⋆V (v)Kv = E
[
E
[
XX⊤
∣∣V ]] = E[XX⊤]  K,
(82)
where we have denoted Kv , E
[
XvX
⊤
v
]
.
Since the extremes of the chain of inequalities in (80) match, all inequalities are, in fact, equalities. Equality
in step (d) implies that PV˜ |Xθ1 ,Xθ2
achieves F
q×q
λ0,α,η
(Xθ1 ,Xθ2). Furthermore, by Proposition 5, since (d) and (e)
are equalities we have that Xθ1 − V˜ −Xθ2 , and that PV˜ |Xθ1 and PV˜ |Xθ2 achieve F
q
λ0,α,η
(Xθ1) and F
q
λ0,α,η
(Xθ1),
respectively. Finally, equality in (f) means that V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = Fq
λ0,α,η
(Xθj |V˜ ) = fqλ0,α,η(Xθj |V˜ ), for j = 1, 2.
F. Proof of Theorem 5
As a consequence of Proposition 7, for any fixed (v1, v2) ∈ V2, Xv1 + Xv2 and Xv1 −Xv2 are independent.
Combined with Xv1 and Xv2 being independent zero mean random variables, Corollary 3 in Appendix I-A of
[16] implies that Xv1 and Xv2 are Gaussian random vectors with the same covariance matrix. Since the pair
(v1, v2) ∈ V2 is arbitrary, we see that all Gaussian vectors {Xv}v∈V have the same covariance matrix. Furthermore,
we may assume that {Xv}v∈V are all centered, and therefore, we get that this is an i.i.d. set of Gaussian random
variables. Denoting this common covariance matrix by K⋆, it clearly satisfies K⋆  K. Letting X⋆ ∼ N (0,K⋆),
we have
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K)
(a)
= fq
λ0,α,η
(X|V ) (b)=
m∑
i=1
P ⋆V (vi)f
q
λ0,α,η
(Xvi)
(c)
=
m∑
i=1
P ⋆V (vi)f
q
λ0,α,η
(X⋆) = fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆), (83)
where (a) follows since (V,X) ∼ P ⋆V,X attains V˜ qλ0,α,η(K) (Proposition 6), (b) follows by the definition of Xv in
the statement of Proposition 7, while (c) follows since X⋆ and Xvi are identically distributed, for every i ∈ [m].
To account for the uniqueness of the zero-mean maximizer we first show that if a zero mean random vector X
is a maximizer, i.e., V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = fq
λ0,α,η
(X), it must be Gaussian. Let X1 and X1 be two i.i.d. copies of X.
Applying Proposition 7 while taking V to be a constant, we obtain that X1+X2 and X1−X2 are also independent.
Hence, by [16, Corollary 3], X is Gaussian.
Next, suppose that V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) has two independent Gaussian maximizers denoted by A1 ∼ N (0,K1) and
A2 ∼ N (0,K2), such thatK1,K2  andK1 6= K2. Let (V,X) be a pair of random variables, such that V ∼ Ber
(
1
2
)
on V = {1, 2}, X∣∣{V = 1} ∼ N (0,K1) and X∣∣{V = 2} ∼ N (0,K2). Note that (V,X) also attains V˜ qλ0,α,η(K).
Taking v1 = 1 and v2 = 2, Proposition 7 implies that A1 +A2 and A1 −A2 are independent, which contradict
Corollary 3 from [16] as K1 6= K2.
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G. Proof of Corollary 3
By Theorem 5, there is an X⋆ ∼ N (0,K⋆), such that K⋆  K and fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆) = V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K). Let X′ ∼
N (0,K − K⋆) be independent of X⋆ and set X = X⋆ + X′. Thus X ∼ N (0,K) and by definition we have
F
q
λ0,α,η
(X) ≤ V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K).
On the other hand,
F
q
λ0,α,η
(X) = sup
PV |X:
V−X−(Y1,Y2)
f
q
λ0,α,η
(X|V )
(a)
≥ fq
λ0,α,η
(X|X′) (b)= fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆) = V˜ q
λ0,α,η
(K), (84)
where (a) follows since X′ −X − (Y1,Y2) forms a Markov chain, while (b) follows because X
∣∣{X′ = x′} ∼
X⋆ + x′. Thus,
V˜
q
λ0,α,η
(K) = Fq
λ0,α,η
(X) = fq
λ0,α,η
(X⋆) = (λ2 − α¯λ0)I(X⋆;Y2)− αλ0I(X⋆;Y1) + Tqλ,η(X⋆). (85)
By Theorem 4, one can decompose X⋆ into independent X⋆1 ∼ N (0,K1) and X⋆2 ∼ N (0,K2), with K1+K2 
K⋆, such that
T
q
λ,η(X
⋆) = tq
λ,η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2) = Vˆ
q
λ,η(K
⋆), (86)
and
S
q
η(X
⋆
1 +X
⋆
2) = s
q
η(X
⋆
1) = V
q
η (K1 +K2). (87)
The proof of existence is concluded by setting X⋆3 ∼ N (0,K3), where K3 = K⋆ − (K1 + K2) and noting that
X = X⋆1 + X
⋆
2 + X
⋆
3 + X
′ ∼ N (0,K) and X⋆ = X⋆1 + X⋆2 + X⋆3 ∼ N (0,K⋆), which implies that (37) holds.
The uniqueness of the decomposition (i.e., of the covariance matrices K1, K2 and K3) is a direct consequence of
Theorems 3, 4 and 5.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two-user MIMO Gaussian BC with common, private and confidential messages was studied. The private
message to Receiver 1 is confidential and kept secret from Receiver 2. The secrecy-capacity region without a
common message was characterized first and Gaussian inputs were shown to achieve optimality. The proof relied
on establishing an equivalence between certain inner and outer bounds using factorization of UCEs [16] and a
variant of DPC [20]. Our results showed that using DPC to cancel out the signal of the non-confidential message
at Receiver 1 exhausts the entire region, making DPC against the signal of the confidential message unnecessary.
This secrecy-capacity region without a common message was then used to characterize a portion of the region
with a common message. The rest of the region was found using double-nested UCEs. The secrecy-capacity region
without a common message was illustrated using a numerical example. To make the region (efficiently) computable,
matrix decomposition properties from [21] were leveraged. The region was shown to be strictly larger than the
secrecy-capacity region of the MIMO Gaussian BC with confidential messages (in which each private message is
kept secret from the opposite user).
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF INNER AND OUTER BOUNDS
A. Outer Bounds 1 and 3
We first establish Bound 3 as an outer bound on the secrecy-capacity region of the setting with a common
message, and then use it to establish Bound 1 as an outer bound on the region without a common message.
The result of [23, Theorem 3] characterizes an outer bound RO(L1, L2) on the (L1, L2)-leakage-capacity region
of a DM-BC with common and private messages, for some leakage thresholds (L1, L2) ∈ R2+. Setting L1 = 0 and
letting L2 → ∞ in RO(L1, L2) (which corresponds to M1 being confidential and M2 not being subject to any
secrecy requirements), we have that the closure of the union of rate triples (R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R0 ≤ min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(88a)
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W,V )− I(U ;Y2|W,V ) (88b)
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;Y2|W ) (88c)
R0 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2|W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(88d)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W ) + I(V ;Y2|W,U) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(88e)
over all (W,U, V )−X − (Y1, Y2), is an outer bound on C. By removing the rate bounds in (88c) and (88e) from
RO(0,∞), one recovers the region O from (54). Clearly RO(0,∞) ⊆ O, which shows that C ⊆ O and establishes
Bound 3.
When there is no common message, one obtains Bound 1, i.e., that Cˆ ⊆ Oˆ, by setting R0 = 0 into Bound 3.
This follows by noting that
I(V ;Y2|W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
} ≤ I(W,V ;Y2), (89)
and defining V˜ = (W,V ).
B. Inner Bounds 2 and 4
Referring to [23, Theorem 1], we have RI(0,∞) as an inner bound on C, where RI(0,∞) is the closure of the
union of rate triples (R0, R1, R2) ∈ R3+ satisfying:
R0 ≤ min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(90a)
R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V ) (90b)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(90c)
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R0 +R2 ≤ I(V ;Y2|W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(90d)
R0 +R1 +R2 ≤ I(U ;Y1|W ) + I(V ;Y2|W )− I(U ;V |W ) + min
{
I(W ;Y1), I(W ;Y2)
}
(90e)
over all (W,U, V ) − X − (Y1, Y2). The inclusion I ⊆ RI(0,∞) immediately follows by noting that if (R1, R2)
satisfy (55) then they also satisfy (90). A simple consequence of the above is that Bound 2 is an inner bound on the
secrecy-capacity region without a common message, which follows by setting R0 = 0 and W = 0 into Bound 4.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First notice that (40) are supporting hyperplanes of OˆK and that the points (HK1 , 0) and (0,HK2 ) are on its
boundary. Furthermore, R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0 and R2 ≤ HK2 are also supporting hyperplanes of IˆK, and since
(0,HK2 ) ∈ IˆK, it is a boundary point of IˆK. Note that HK1 describes the secrecy-capacity of the MIMO Gaussian
WTC, where User 1 serves as the legitimate receiver and User 2 as the eavesdropper. Therefore (see [7]–[9]),
HK1 =
1
2
max
0K⋆K
log
∣∣I + G1K⋆G⊤1 ∣∣− log ∣∣I + G2K⋆G⊤2 ∣∣ . (91)
To see that (HK1 , 0) is also in IˆK consider the following. For every 0  K⋆  K, let X1 and X2 be independent
Gaussian random vectors with covariances K⋆ and K−K⋆, respectively. Set
U = X1 +AX2
V = X2
X = X1 +X2,
where A = K⋆G⊤1
[
I+G1K
⋆G⊤1
]−1
is the precoding matrix for suppressing V fromY1 [20, Theorem 1]. Evaluating
the mutual information terms on the RHS of (39a), we first have
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;V ) = I(X;Y1|V ) = 1
2
log
∣∣I + G1K⋆G⊤1 ∣∣ . (92)
Moreover,
I(U ;Y2|V ) = I
(
X1 +AX2; G2(X1 +X2) + Z2
∣∣X2)
= I(X1; G2X1 + Z2|X2)
(a)
= I(X1; G2X1 + Z2)
=
1
2
log
∣∣I + G2K⋆G⊤2 ∣∣ , (93)
where (a) follows because (X1,Z2) and X2 are independent. Combining (92) with (93) yields
I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;V )− I(U ;Y2|V ) = 1
2
log
∣∣I + G1K⋆G⊤1 ∣∣− 12 log
∣∣I + G2K⋆G⊤2 ∣∣ , (94)
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which implies that (HK1 , 0) ∈ IˆK. Furthermore, since (HK1 , 0) is on the boundary of OˆK and IˆK ⊆ OˆK, (HK1 , 0)
must also be a boundary point of IˆK, and therefore, R1 ≤ HK1 is a supporting hyperplane of IˆK.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF AUXILIARY RESULTS FOR PROPOSITION 6 - LEMMAS 2 AND 3
A. Proof of Lemma 2
By Theorem 4, we have that if E
[
XX⊤
]  K, then
Vˆ
q
λ,η(K) = t
q
λ,η(X
⋆), (95)
where X⋆ = X⋆1+X
⋆
2, and X
⋆
1 and X
⋆
2 are independent random variables with X
⋆
j ∼ N (0,Kj), for j = 1, 2, such
that K⋆ , K1 + K2  K. Furthermore, by the definition of the UCE and the definition of Vˆ qλ,η(K), (95) implies
that for every X ∼ PX with E
[
XX⊤
]  K, we have
t
q
λ,η(X) ≤ Tqλ,η(X) ≤ Vˆ qλ,η(K) = tqλ,η(X⋆). (96)
Thus,
sup
X: E[XX⊤]K
t
q
λ,η(X) ≤ λ1I(X⋆;Y1)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X⋆;Y2) + λ1Sqη(X⋆)
(a)
= λ1I(X
⋆;Y1)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X⋆;Y2) + λ1sqη(X⋆1)
(b)
≤ λ1I(X⋆;Y1)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X⋆;Y2) + λ1Cη, (97)
where (a) is by Theorem 4, while (b) follows from an adaptation of [16, Proposition 19] to the function sqη(X) as
defined in (17), which implies that for η > 1 there exists a Cη , such that s
q
η(X) ≤ Cη , for all PX (see Remark 8).
By (97), we have
sup
X
t
q
λ,η(X) ≤ sup
0K: X∼N (0,K)
λ1I(X;Y1)− (λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2) + λ1Cη. (98)
Let Σj = (G
⊤
j Gj)
−1, j = 1, 2. For X ∼ N (0,K), we write
2λ1I(X;Y1)− 2(λ1 + λ2)I(X;Y2)
= λ1 log |I + G1KG⊤1 | − (λ1 + λ2) log |I + G2KG⊤2 |
= λ1 log |I + KG1G⊤1 | − (λ1 + λ2) log |I + KG2G⊤2 |
(a)
= −λ1 log |Σ1|+ (λ1 + λ2) log |Σ2|+ λ1
(
log |Σ1 +K| − λ log |Σ2 +K|
)
, (99)
where (a) is by setting λ , λ1+λ2
λ1
> 1. To bound the last two terms, we use the min-max theorem on eigenvalues:
Let µi(A) be the ith smallest eigenvalue of the symmetric matrix A ∈ Rt×t, we have
µi(A) = min
Li
max
0 6=u∈Li
u⊤Au
u⊤u
= max
Lt+1−i
min
0 6=u∈Lt+1−i
u⊤Au
u⊤u
, (100)
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where Li is an i-dimensional subspace of R
t. Since the t-dimensional subspace of Rt is unique (that is, Lt = Rt),
we obtain
µ1(A) = max
Lt
min
0 6=u∈Lt
u⊤Au
u⊤u
= min
0 6=u∈Lt
u⊤Au
u⊤u
(101a)
µt(A) = min
Lt
max
0 6=u∈Lt
u⊤Au
u⊤u
= max
0 6=u∈Lt
u⊤Au
u⊤u
. (101b)
The RHSs of (101) imply that for every non-zero u ∈ Rt we have µ1(A) ≤ u⊤Auu⊤u ≤ µt(A). We upper and lower
bound the ith eigenvalue of K+Σj , for j = 1, 2, as follows
µi(K + Σj) = min
Li
max
0 6=u∈Li
(
u⊤Ku
u⊤u
+
u⊤Σju
u⊤u
)


≥ min
Li
max
0 6=u∈Li
(
u⊤Ku
u⊤u
+ µ1(Σj)
)
= µi(K) + µ1(Σj),
≤ min
Li
max
0 6=u∈Li
(
u⊤Ku
u⊤u
+ µt(Σj)
)
= µi(K) + µt(Σj).
(102)
Hence the eigenvalues of K+Σj , j = 1, 2, satisfy
µi(K) + µ1(Σj) ≤ µi(K + Σj) ≤ µi(K) + µt(Σj), (103)
where i ∈ [t]. We now bound the last two terms in (99) as
log |Σ1 +K| − λ log |Σ2 +K| =
t∑
i=1
log
(
µi(K + Σ1)
µi(K + Σ2)λ
)
(a)
≤
t∑
i=1
log
(
µi(K) + µt(Σ1)(
µi(K) + µ1(Σ2)
)λ
)
≤ t ·max
i
log
(
µi(K) + µt(Σ1)(
µi(K) + µ1(Σ2)
)λ
)
(b)
≤ t · log
(
µ⋆ + µt(Σ1)(
µ⋆ + µ1(Σ2)
)λ
)
, (104)
where (a) follows from by (102), and (b) is by setting µ⋆ = max
{
0, 11−λ
(
µ1(Σ2)− λµt(Σ1)
)}
and noting that
µi(K) ≥ 0 and that the derivative of the function c(x) , log
(
x+µt(Σ1)
)−λ log (x+µ1(Σ2)) is zero at x = µ⋆,
negative when x > µ⋆ and positive when x < µ⋆. Since µt(Σ1), µ1(Σ2) > 0 (which holds since the positive
semi-definite matrices Σ1 and Σ2 are invertible), we conclude that for every X ∼ PX
t
q
λ,η(X) ≤ −λ1 log |Σ1|+ (λ1 + λ2) log |Σ2|+ λ1 · t · log

 µ⋆ + µt(Σ1)(
µ⋆ + µ1(Σ2)
)λ1+λ2
λ1

 , Bλ,η <∞. (105)
B. Proof of Lemma 3
The proof of Lemma 3 follows immediately by an adaptation of [16, Proposition 20] (see Remark 8) and by [16,
Theorem 5], which, respectively, imply that Sqη(Xn) −−−−→
n→∞
Sqη(X
⋆), and that h(Yj,n) −−−−→
n→∞
h(Y⋆j ), for j = 1, 2.
Here Y1,n and Y2,n are the outputs of the MIMO Gaussian BC with input Xn.
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C. Proof of Lemma 4
Let i ∈ [m] be such that α⋆i = 0 and note that for every Kˆ  0, we have
v˜q
λ0,α,η
(
Kˆ
) (a)
= fq
λ0,α,η
(
X⋆
Kˆ
)
(b)
≤ λ2I
(
X⋆
Kˆ
;Y2
)
+ Bˆλ0,α,η
≤ λ2
2
log
∣∣I +G2KˆG⊤2 ∣∣+ Bˆλ0,α,η, (106)
where (a) follows from (75) and the non-negativity of mutual information, while (b) is since T
q
λ,η(X) is bounded.
Let
{
α
(nk)
i
}
k∈N
be a subsequence of
{
α
(n)
i
}
n∈N
, such that α
(nk)
i > 0 for every k ∈ N (if there is no such
subsequence, the result of Lemma 4 is immediate). Since α
(nk)
i K
(nk)
i  K and α(nk)i > 0, we obtain
K
(nk)
i 
1
α
(nk)
i
K, ∀k ∈ N. (107)
We thus conclude that
α
(nk)
i v˜
q
λ0,α,η
(
K
(nk)
i
) (a)≤ α(nk)i
(
λ2
2
log
∣∣I + G2K(nk)i G⊤2 ∣∣+ Bˆλ0,α,η
)
(b)
≤ α(nk)i
(
λ2
2
log
∣∣∣∣∣I +G2 Kα(nk)i G
⊤
2
∣∣∣∣∣+ Bˆλ0,α,η
)
(c)
= α
(nk)
i

λ2
2
t∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
µj
α
(nk)
i
)
+ Bˆλ0,α,η

 −−−−→
n→∞
0, (108)
where (a) and (b) follow from (106) and (107), respectively, while (c) follows by denoting the eigenvalues of
G2KG
⊤
2 by {µj}tj=1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
The proof relies on a result from [27, Corollary 2], which we reproduce in the following.
Proposition 11 (Min-Max Interchange) Let Λd ,
{
λ ∈ Rd+
∣∣∣∑di=1 λi = 1} be the d-dimensional simplex. Let P
be a set of distribution PU over a set U . Let
{
gi : P → R
}
i∈[d]
be a set of functionals such that
A ,
{
a ∈ Rd
∣∣∣∀i ∈ [d], ∃PU ∈ P , ai ≤ gi(PU )} (109)
is a convex set. Then
sup
PU∈P
min
λ∈Λd
d∑
i=1
λigi(PU ) = min
λ∈Λd
sup
PU∈P
d∑
i=1
λigi(PU ). (110)
Let d = 2 and P be the set of PDFs PW,V,U,X that satisfy E
[
XX⊤
]  K. Set
g1 (PW,V,U,X) = λ0I(W ;Y1) + λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W ) (111a)
g2 (PW,V,U,X) = λ0I(W ;Y2) + λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W ), (111b)
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and consider the corresponding set A from (109). To show that A is convex, let (a1, a2), (b1, b2) ∈ A and Pa, Pb ∈ P
be two distributions, such that ai ≤ gi(Pa) and bi ≤ gi(Pb), for i = 1, 2. Fix α ∈ [0, 1] and consider a distribution
P given by
P (w, v, u,x) = αPa(w, v, u,x) + α¯Pb(w, v, u,x), ∀(w, v, u,x) ∈ W × V × U × Xn. (112)
Equivalently, P can be represented by setting W˜ = (Q,W ), where Q ∼ Ber(α), and denoting P , PW˜ ,V,U,X =
P(Q,W ),V,U,X, for which
P(Q,W ),V,U,X
(
(0, w), v, u,x
)
= αPa(w, v, u,x) (113a)
P(Q,W ),V,U,X
(
(1, w), v, u,x
)
= α¯Pb(w, v, u,x), (113b)
for all (w, v, u,x) ∈ W × V × U × Xn. First note that
EP
[
XXT
]
= αEPa
[
XXT
]
+ α¯EPb
[
XXT
]  K, (114)
where EQ denotes that an expectation is taken with respect to Q. This implies that P ∈ P .
Next, by evaluating gi, i = 1, 2, with respect to P , we have
gi(P ) = λ0IP (W˜ ;Yi) + λ1
[
IP (U ;Y1|W˜ )− IP (U ;V |W˜ )− IP (U ;Y2|W˜ , V )
]
+ λ2IP (V ;Y2|W˜ )
= λ0IP (Q;Yi) + αgi(Pa) + α¯gi(Pb)
≥ αai + α¯bi, (115)
implying that α(a1, a2) + α¯(b1, b2) ∈ A, which establishes the convexity of A. In the above, IP indicates that
a mutual information term is taken with respect to an underlying distribution P . The proof of Proposition 9 is
completed by invoking Proposition 11, while noting that for every tuple of random variables (W,V, U,X), with
(W,V, U)−X− (Y1,Y2) and E
[
XX⊤
]  K, the minimum
min
α∈[0,1]


λ0
[
αI(W ;Y1) + α¯I(W ;Y2)
]
+ λ1
[
I(U ;Y1|W )− I(U ;V |W )− I(U ;Y2|W,V )
]
+ λ2I(V ;Y2|W )

 (116)
is attained by either α = 0 or α = 1.
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